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I. INTRODUCTION
To the casual observer, it may seem bizarre to speak of the
liberty of the Argentine press during periods of de facto govern-
ment. A reference to freedom of the press during de facto periods
is apt to elicit a dry remark even among Argentines. The dichot-
omy between the text of the national Constitution and the prac-
tices of military governments is still fresh in the Argentine psyche.
An analysis of Argentine Supreme Court decisions, however, offers
a different perspective. The Court has struggled to uphold basic
press freedoms despite the hostile political climate. Moreover, it
has helped preserve some semblance of the constitutional structure
envisioned by the Argentine framers.
This paper will focus on the freedom accorded the Argentine
press and will treat prior censorship as it is understood in Argen-
* B.A., 1982 Princeton University, J.D., 1985 Columbia Univerisy School of Law. Mr.
Kartheiser studied under a Rotary Fellowship during 1985-86 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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tine case law.' Particular attention is paid to the closure of publi-
cations. This focus has been adopted for two reasons. First, judicial
doctrine on prior censorship is of critical importance to a republi-
can system and especially so to Argentina's fledgling democracy.
Second, because of the nature of the country's political heritage
and a particular provision of its Constitution, the treatment of
press closures compels a review of the nation's de facto and state
of siege phenomena. These additional factors are of considerable
interest: they illuminate the Argentine judiciary's quest to preserve
its independence, and hence its efficacy as protector of the individ-
ual rights embodied in the Constitution.
A brief review of the Argentine Constitution is in order before
moving on to more specific themes. Adopted in 1853, it is the old-
est contemporary Latin American constitution. In many ways, it
tracks the ideology of the U.S. Constitution.2 It provides for a re-
publican form of government and a federal state. It creates execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches, invests them with separate
powers, and links them with a matrix of checks and balances. It
enumerates a host of individual rights, including religious freedom,
the freedoms of expression and of association, the right to due pro-
cess, the right to petition the government, the right to own prop-
erty and to its inviolability, the right to work and receive a fair
remuneration, and the right to a minimum wage.
3
It is essential to bear in mind that the juridical optic affords
only a limited view of the liberty of the press in Argentina. Those
who are skeptical of the power of Argentine constitutional doctrine
to channel and structure political activity do, indeed, have a point.
Political events have often circumscribed the rights seemingly set
forth in the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions. At times,
1. The Argentine concept of prior censorship enjoys a significantly broader scope than
the concept of "prior restraint" as described in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2. Forty-four articles of the U.S. and Argentine Constitutions are nearly identical,
twenty-two are similar, forty-eight are different, and sixty articles of the Argentine docu-
ment do not exist in the U.S. Constitution. Linares Quintana, Comparison of the United
States and Argentine Constitutional Systems, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1948-49), cited in
Garro, The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental Action Under a
State of Siege, 4 HuM, RTS. L.J. 311, 312 n.1 (1983); J.R. VANOSSi, LA INFLUENCIA DE LA
CONSTITUC16}N DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTEAMERICA EN LA CONSTITUC16N DE LA REPOB-
LICA ARGENTINA (1976). See 2 S. LINARES QUINTANA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y INSTITU-
CIONES POLITICAS, 589-642 (1976)(genesis of constitutionalism in Argentina); JUAN B. AL-
BERDI, BASES Y PUNTOS DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACI6N DE LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA
(1852).
3. Constituci6n de Ia Naci6n Argentina [CoNST. arts. 1, 14-18.
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this circumscription has been painfully obvious. The late General
and President Per6n, for example, converted La Prensa, one of Ar-
gentina's two newspapers of international repute, into a mouth-
piece for his pro-labor views. When La Prensa's eighty-year tradi-
tion of outspokenness fell out of favor with the General in January
1951, he seized, closed, and then reopened the daily "as the house
organ" of his powerful labor confederation.4 Extrajudicial force was
applied to the exclusion of constitutional free press principles in an
even more brutal fashion between 1976 and 1983. 5 A minimum of
eighty-four journalists were among the estimated 9,000 citizens
who "disappeared" during the military's anti-terrorism campaign.'
The bulk of the disappearances occurred at the outset of the
Proceso, resulting in heavy self-censorship within the press corps.
7
Today, Argentina enjoys constitutional rule. While the use of overt
coercion has disappeared, more subtle forms appear to persist.
Current pressures emanate from the size and structure of Argen-
tina's large state budget, which easily makes the state the single
largest advertiser in printed publications. The sheer magnitude of
the state's advertising budget may entice the press to follow the
editorial policy most likely to attract state accounts. The impact of
the governmental advertising expenditures upon the editorial pol-
icy of the press becomes a serious consideration.'
II. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PRIOR CENSORSHIP
Freedom of the press in Argentina is rooted in Articles 14 and
32 of the Constitution. The latter states that, "the federal Con-
4. R.A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 1945-1962, 104-05 (1980).
5. This is the period of military rule characterized by, among other things, the promul-
gation of the Statute for the Process of National Reorganization. This epoch will be referred
to as the Proceso. Compare the peculiarities of the Proceso with other Argentine military
governments, P6rez Guilrou, La Corte Suprema de Justicia y el Gobierno De Facto Argen-
tine (1976-1980), 9 ANUARIO JURIDICO 811 (1982).
6. CoMIsI6N NACIONAL SOBR LA DESAPARECI6N DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAs, 267-74
(1985)[hereinafter NUNCA MAS]; see also Somos, Oct. 23, 1985, at 10 (estimates of the num-
ber of "desaparecidos" made by various human rights organizations, all of which ranged
between 5,000 and 30,000. The Ministry of the Interior serving during the Proceso calcu-
lated a figure exceeding 3,000).
7. NUNCA MAs, supra note 6, at 367-74. See Bidart Campos, La Autocensura en la
Libertad de Expresi6n, 83 EL DERECHO [E.D.] 895 (1979)(decries the self-censorship prac-
ticed during the Proceso; the article was written during the same period).
8. Interview with Dr. Caldas Villar, Director of the Asociaci6n de Entidades Periodisti-
cas Argentinas (ADEPA) and Mr. Jorge Vago, Editor and Director of Prensa Confidencial




gress shall not dictate laws that restrict the liberty of the press or
establish federal jurisdiction over it." This provision raises federal-
ism issues and interpretive questions regarding the word "re-
strict."' While Article 32 is sometimes called upon to support
broad assertions of press freedoms, it has not been the focal point
in press closings.
Instead, Article 14 commands our attention: it is the primary
source of press liberties in the Argentine Republic.10 Article 14
states that "all inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights
according to the laws that regulate their exercise; to wit .. . to
publish their ideas through the press without prior censorship."'"
After an initial reading, this language appears too narrow to pro-
tect free expression and the freedom of the press. It speaks to only
one mode of expression and to just one means of forestalling it.
The Supreme Court, however, has greatly expanded the seem-
ingly narrow scope of Article 14. It now protects a wide range of
expression against more than the sole danger of prior censorship.
In 1932, the Court set forth an important doctrine regarding the
meaning of "prior censorship.' It stated that Article 14's protec-
tion extends to all limitations imposed prior to publication. This
includes prior submission of written material for official revision as
well as other "similar" tactics "that governments have been known
to use."' 3
The Court's expansion of Article 14's temporal, scope however,
was even more significant. In essence, the Court read "prior" to
mean "before or after publication." It recognized that post-publi-
cation punishment may be just as damaging to a free press as prior
censorship.4
The Court further amplified the scope of Article 14 in the
Eduardo Perez case." In Eduardo Perez, the owner-editor of a
9. G. BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCiONAL ARGENTINO 225 (1974)
[hereinafter MANUAL DE DERECHO].
10. The free press provision of Article 14 traces its heritage back to Article 111 of the
Constitution of 1819, which recognized the "right to publish ideas through the press," a
right "essential for the preservation of civil liberty." Linares Quintana, supra note 2, at 627.
11. CONST. art. 14 (Argen.).
12. Judgment of Dec. 23, 1932, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacibn [C.J.N.] XL
JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA [J.A.] 309 (1932)[hereinafter Ministerio Fiscal case].
13. Id. at 311.
14. Id.
15. Judgment of Sept. 17, 1962, C.J.N., 257 Fallos de Ia Corte Suprema de Justicia de Is
Naci~n [Fallos] 308 [hereinafter Eduardo Perez case].
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newspaper published a defamatory advertisement over the signa-
ture of the advertisement's author. Although the editor's only con-
nection with the advertisement was his decision to publish it, he
was convicted and fined along with the acknowledged author. In
reversing the editor's conviction, the Court held that, based upon
Articles 14, 32, and 33, the constitutional freedom of the press en-
joys a broader scope than the mere exclusion of prior censorship
under the terms of Article 14.18 The Court reasoned that, if the
threat of criminal responsibility were to affect the editorial deci-
sion to publish, the freedom of the press would be compromised
"to the same extent as through pre-publication restrictions, with
the consequent frustration of the basic principle of freedom of the
press expressly provided for in Articles 14 and 32 . . . . and to
which Articles 1, 6, and 33 .. .also refer." 17
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Court has extended the pro-
tection afforded traditional means of expression and dissemination
to other media."8 The Court in Mallo faced the issue of whether
the prohibition of the projection of a film was a reasonable use of
state of siege powers. The threshold question was whether consti-
tutional guaranties were implicated in a case involving the film me-
dium. While recognizing that the founders of 1853 could not have
contemplated cinematography, the Court extended the same con-
stitutional protection enjoyed by more traditional means of expres-
sion to the film medium.
1 9
The reasoning in the Ministerio Fiscal, Mallo, and Editorial
16. Id. at 313. The inclusion of Article 14 in the cluster of provisions that support
broad press protections is consistent with the expansive opinion in the Ministerial Fiscal
case; however, it clashes with statements made in the Eduardo Perez case. After making the
statement quoted above, the Court declared that Article 14 applies to cases involving prior
censorship. The contradiction stems from the Court's mix of two modes of interpretation,
textual and structural, in the same case. Unfortunately, one is left with a fuzzy view of the
dimensions of Article 14, and the feeling that its scope changes according to the Court's
prevailing interpretive mode.
17. Eduardo Perez, 257 Fallos at 314-15. The pertinent parts of the freshly cited arti-
cles all refer to the phrase "federal republican representative form of government." CONST.
arts. 1, 6, 33 (Argen.).
18. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1971, C.J.N., 282 Fallos 392 [hereinafter Mallo case].
19. Although an important extension of the scope of Article 14, this point was an-
nounced cryptically. The Court, in a later case, stated with equal brevity that Articles 14,
32, and 33 also protect artistic expression. Judgment of June 29, 1976, C.J.N., 295 Falloa
215, 217 [hereinafter Colombres case]. The Court in Colombres, however, also recognized an
exhibition of art depicting a tortured human figure and the caption "Made in Argentina" as
a valid exercise of the Executive's police power on grounds that the display might afect
"the nation's image" in the exterior.
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Perfil cases stretches the bounds of the constitutional text. The
Court's expansive construction, however, is anchored in structural
inferences and in an understanding of the strong currents of classi-
cal liberalism that permeated the thought of the Argentine
framers.20
III. THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE
It must be emphasized that this straightforward account of
the textual roots and judicial expansion of press freedoms de-
scribes only a portion of the Argentine free press experience. De
facto governments and the nation's state of siege experiences have
had a strong influence on the exercise of the liberty of the press
and on the structural relations between the branches of
government.
A de facto government is one that assumes control of state
machinery through a rupture in the constitutional process. Its
mandate is rooted in power, not compliance with the norms of suc-
cession. While Argentina endured a bout of de facto rule during
the last century, the bulk of its de facto experience is of relatively
recent vintage. Argentina has suffered a string of de facto interrup-
tions since the first military coup of the twentieth century in 1930.
Typically, the military expresses its displeasure with the country's
state of affairs by ousting the incumbent president and appropriat-
ing executive power for itself. The Congress and Supreme Court
often join the dethroned executive as casualties of the coup: Con-
gress may be dissolved and judges replaced."1
Interestingly enough, no de facto regime has discarded the
Constitution altogether. Instead, the practice is to promulgate a
20. Alberdi was a strong advocate of maximizing civic and commercial freedom. While
he favored a liberal constitution because it would best attract the European immigrants that
population-starved Argentina needed, he was also a classic liberal at heart. The draft of the
constitution published in his "BAsEs" accorded foreigners and citizens alike the right to
publish their ideas through the press without prior censorship as well as to petition all au-
thorities. JUAN B. ALBERDI, supra note 2, at 288. See generally Linares Quintana, supra note
2.
21. The 1976 coup provides a clear example of this phenomenon. After the coup, the
ruling junta promulgated the Statute for the Process of National Reorganization. The stat-
ute replaced the Congress with a legislative commission composed of nine military officers,
replaced the members of the Supreme Court, and transferred executive and all important
Congressional functions to the junta and its military legislature. Acta Para el Proceso de
Reorganizacibn Nacional, 36-B Anuario de Legislaci6n [A.L.J.A.) 1019 (1976); see also Acta
Para Ia Revoluci6n Argentina, 26-B Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina [A.D.L.A.] 753 (1976).
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"revolutionary statute" or series of "institutional acts" upon seiz-
ing power. 22 These revolutionary instruments customarily outline
the objectives and operational norms of the de facto regime. The
Constitution, in turn, remains in effect insofar as its provisions do
not clash with these norms and objectives. 28 Through this mecha-
nism, the Constitution has survived in name, if not always in
practice.
The Supreme Court has had the unenviable task of reconciling
constitutional and de facto norms. This uneasy orchestration of
Argentina's constitutional concepts and political realities began in
the last century. In 1865, the Court stated that a de facto regime
exercises "provisionally all national powers," a faculty that is
rooted in "the right of the triumphant revolution, assented to by
the people." 24 Following the 1930 coup, a de facto government was
acknowledged to exercise "executive powers, but not legislative
and judicial" powers."' In 1947, however, the Court abandoned its
restrictive approach. It conceded that "a de facto government has
legislative powers to the extent . . . necessary to govern," the de-
termination of which was deemed a "matter of political discretion"
closed to judicial review.2 6 Thus, acts and decrees promulgated by
de facto r6gimes have been incorporated into the body of Argen-
tine law and, indeed, into the nation's constitutional law.
27
The Court's reaction to the 1930 coup illustrates its means of
coping in the de facto environment. It issued an internal memoran-
dum to the national judiciary immediately following the coup: the
Acordada of 1930.28 Through the Acordada, the Court recognized
22. Acts Para el Proceso de Reorganizaci6n Nacional, at 1019.
23. See Garro, supra note 2, at 312. Revolutionary norms, however, do not always
trump constitutional provisions. See, e.g., the discussion of the Azul y Blanco case Judg-
ment of Apr. 30, 1968, C.J.N., 22 E.D. 580; infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
24. Judgment of May 12, 1865, C.J.N., 2 Fallos 127 1hereinafter Baldomero Martinez
case].
25. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1933, C.J.N., 169 Fallos 309 [hereinafter Administraci6n de
Impuestos Internos c. Malmonge].
26. Judgment of Aug. 22, 1947, C.J.N., 208 Fallos 184, 186 [hereinafter Arlandini case].
27. See Judgment of 1977, C.J.N., 296 Fallos 372 (discussion of the relation between de
facto decrees and the Constitution. De facto decrees are "incorporated into" the Constitu-
tion inasmuch as the causes that gave the de facto regime its legitimacy persist). G. BmiART
CAMPOS, LA CONSTITUcI6N Y LOS INSTRUMEN.ros NoRMATivos DEL AcTuAL PRocEso DE REOR-
GANIZACI6N NACIONAL (1979). While the language "incorporated into" implies a parallel
ranking, the Court's application of it in Judgment of Sept. 17, 1979, C.J.N., 301 Fallos 771
(1979)[hereinafter Timerman case], demonstrates a hierarchical structure with the Consti-
tution held as supreme.
28. Acordada sabre reconocimiento del Gorbierno Provincial de la Nacibn, 158 Fallos
1986]
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the new regime and termed it a de facto government. It founded its
recognition upon "necessity" and professed "the end of protecting
the public." The high court also admitted the futility of contesting
the new government's legitimacy or that of its functionaries. In es-
sence, the Court bowed to reality: a confrontation would have only
further damaged the weakened constitutional construct.
The Court stopped short, however, of ceding all power to the
regime. It warned that:
[S]hould the functionaries that compose the de facto govern-
ment disregard individual guaranties, those of property, or
others guaranteed by the constitution, the Judicial Power en-
trusted with ensuring compliance with it will reestablish those
guaranties with the same reach that it would do in the case of a
de jure Executive Power.2
For obvious reasons, the Court did not detail how it would reestab-
lish trampled individual rights.
In this respect, the Acordada pinpoints the basic difficulty
which has plagued the judiciary's attempts to exercise its power to
check the encroachments of the other branches of government: it
lacks the means to implement its will. Some argue that the Court
also lacks the will to protect basic liberties. Surely, the Court's rec-
ord during de facto periods does not reveal a vigorous tribunal. In
all fairness, however, it has been subjected to considerable abuse.
Frequent purges of the federal judiciary during the de facto experi-
ence undermined judicial stability." Judicial independence was
damaged in the process; and, indeed, seemingly destroyed when
the Proceso's junta appointed a new Court in 1976 and then re-
quired its members to swear allegiance to the Constitution as well
as the Statute of the Proceso. Allegiance to the former, however,
was sworn only insofar as it did not derogate from the norms set
forth in the latter."1 Personal threats issued to judges thought to
oppose the regime further eroded the spirit of independence.
8 2
Moreover, the newly installed judges had arguably inherited a con-
genital defect from the de facto executive who appointed them;
290-91 (Sept. 10, 1930).
29. Id.
30. The Supreme Court was purged in 1946, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1976. New justices
were appointed in 1983 with the return of democratic institutions. Garro, supra note 2, at
314.
31. Id. at 315.
32. Id. at 334-37.
[Vol. 18:2
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they gained office via the unconstitutional firing of their de jure
predecessors.83 In this sense, they were de facto judges. Neverthe-
less, the same factor that led the Court to recognize the legitimacy
of de facto governments-necessity-prompted the recognition of
the judges such governments appointed.
3 4
Despite this background, the Court has produced liberty-rein-
forcing rulings in the press area. Even more startling is the fact
that some of the cases that now serve as pillars of the free press in
Argentina were handed down by de facto appointees .3  The irony
of these decisions is best appreciated after the introduction of an-
other theme that is closely linked to the observance of press liber-
ties, namely, the state of siege.
IV. THE STATE OF SIEGE DOCTRINE
Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution provides for a state of
siege. The article is to be invoked during periods of emergency and
provides for the suspension of constitutional guarantees.3 Due to
33. Article 96 of the Argentine Constitution states that judges shall "retain their offices
during good behavior." Article 86 accords the President the power to appoint the members
of the federal judiciary with the Senate's concurrence. CONST. art. 86, cl. 5 (Argen.).
34. See Judgment of Feb. 14, 1984, C.J.N., 1984-B REvISTA JURIDICA ARGENTINA-LA
LEY [L.L.] 183. Aramayo was a federal judge who took office during the civilian government
that preceded the Proceso. The junta relieved him of his post. Upon the return of de jure
government in 1983, he contested the validity of his firing and petitioned for reinstatement
and retroactive pay. The Court ruled that the "restitution of constitutional order ... re-
quires that the national powers. . . ratify or reject explicitly or implicitly the acts of the de
facto government" and that "the designation of this Court with the concurrence of the...
Senate implies ratification of the dismissals of the judges" fired by the junta. The implicit
ratification theory was strained indeed. The real basis for the decision was the Court's ad-
mitted fear of the upheaval entailed in finding that the decisions of de facto judges lacked
validity. Id. at 183; see also 2 G. BIDART CAMPOS, EL DzmEcHo CONsTrrucIONAL DEL PODER
231 (1967); Cholvis, Jueces con Inuestidura De Facto, 1983-D L.L. 1033, 1037-38.
35. See, e.g., the Azul y Blanco case, 22 E.D. at 582; Prensa Confidencial case, Judg-
ment of Apr. 30, 1968, C.J.N., 22 E.D. 576; infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. See
La Naci6n, May 5, 1968 (editorial celebrating this irony after these cases were decided).
36. Article 23 states:
In case of internal commotion or foreign attack endangering the exercise of
this Constitution and of the authorities created thereby, the province or terri-
tory where the perturbation of order exists shall be declared in a state of siege
and the constitutional guarantees there shall be suspended, but during this sus-
pension the President of the Republic shall not condemn by himself nor apply
penalties. His power shall be limited, in such a case, with respect to persons, to
arresting them or conveying them from one point to another of the Nation, if
they should not prefer to leave Argentine territory.
CONST. art. 23 (Argen.).
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their frequent declaration and lengthy duration,"7 Argentina's
states of siege have shaped the contours of constitutional rights.
Between 1930 and 1970, Argentina spent forty-five percent of its
time under a state of siege.-3 As one might imagine, press freedoms
were particularly affected during these periods.
Article 23 sets forth two justifications for the declaration of a
state of siege: "foreign attack" and "internal commotion." The
procedures for lawful declaration vary according to the exigency at
hand. In the case of "foreign attack," Article 86, clause 19, calls for
presidential declaration with the concurrence of the Senate. In the
event of "internal commotion," Article 67, clause 26 accords Con-
gress the power to declare the state of siege. If Congress is in re-
cess, the same article gives the president the power. Under Article
86, clause 19, however, Congress retains the power to suspend a
presidential declaration made during its recess.3 9
Beyond these mechanical prerequisites lie Argentina's practi-
cal state of siege experiences. De facto governments have strayed
from constitutional use of Article 23 and launched the judiciary's
consequent search for a check over emergency edicts. The search
dates from 1893 when the Supreme Court held that Article 23 does
not alter the constitution's tripartite republican form of govern-
ment.40 To the contrary, the Court stated that Article 23 offers an
"extreme and transitory recourse" designed to preserve the consti-
tutional order when dislocations threaten to extinguish it."'
37. As the following list shows, states of siege have been imposed twenty times in this
century, for increasingly longer periods of time: July 5-July 30, 1901; November 24-De-
cember 30, 1902; February 4, 1905, term of sixty days; October 8, 1905, term of ninety days;
November 14, 1909, term of sixty days; May 14-October 1, 1910; September 5, 1930, term
of thirty days; September 6, 1930, term of thirty days; October 4, 1930-February 22, 1932;
December 19, 1932-May 2, 1933; December 29, 1933, partially lifted to permit provincial
elections; December 16, 1941-August 6, 1945; September 26, 1945-May 23, 1946; June
17-June 29, 1955; September 2, 1955, term ran into the declaration of the following state of
siege; September 16, 1955-June 28, 1957; November 11, 1958, term of thirty days; Decem-
ber 11, 1958-September 21, 1963; June 30, 1969-May 25, 1973; November 6, 1974-Octo-
ber 28, 1983.
38. Garro, supra note 2, at 318.
39. The checking power ostensibly conferred upon Congress has not been invoked.
Garro notes that of the many examples of executive declarations during congressional re-
cess, not one was overturned when the legislature reconvened. Id. at 319.
40. Judgment of Nov. 17, 1893, C.J.N., 54 Fallos 432 [hereinafter Leandro Alem case];
Judgment of Mar. 13, 1960, C.J.N., 254 Fallos 116 [hereinafter Juan C. Rodriguez case]; J.R.
VANOsSI, TEORA CONSTITUCIONAL 490 (1976).
41. Judgment of Dec. 3, 1985, C.J.N., G-414-XX (slip opinion on file with the U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv.)[bereinafter Granada case]; Judgment of Jan. 18, 1934, C.J.N., 170 Fallos
246 [hereinafter Julieta Meyans de Pueyrred6n case]; Judgment of Feb. 10, 1933, C.J.N.,
[Vol. 18:2
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The Court's construction rests on firm ground. Article 23 re-
fers to extraordinary events that "endanger the exercise of the
Constitution and the authorities created by it" and provides for
the suspension of "constitutional guarantees." Nowhere does it
mention dismantling the constitutional framework. Indeed, its very
terms presuppose the continued vigor of the Constitution: Article
23 imposes limits on executive power during a state of siege and
Congress is empowered to set aside a state of emergency declared
during its recess. In light of these provisions, it is evident that the
Argentine framers shared the Court's vision of the restricted
bounds of Article 23.42
Because Article 23 is not intended to impair the norms and
functions that govern the components of the Argentine state, the
checks and balances that inhere in normal periods, including judi-
cial review, should also operate in times of emergency. The issue is
significant because in the absence of judicial review, Article 23 pro-
vides an "end-run" around the substantive guarantees of the
Constitution.
Judicial review of action taken pursuant to Article 23 may
take two forms: review of the decision to impose a state of siege
and, once a declaration has been made, review of the measures
adopted to restore tranquility. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that the decision to declare a state of siege is entrusted
to the political branches. As such, the fact-finding and decision-
making processes that underlie the declaration are closed to judi-
cial review.43 This rationale is rooted in respect for the division of
powers and the spheres of independent action it implies. The
Court has commented that the Executive is best suited to take
167 Fallos 267, 316-17 [hereinafter Marcelo T. de Alvear case].
42. Alberdi championed a strong Executive invested with state of siege powers. He
rooted his position in the practical experiences of the newly formed South American repub-
lics. After the new states had freed themselves from the rule of Spain, they enacted Consti-
tutions proclaiming individual liberties and creating weak Executives; anarchy ensued. Al-
berdi proposed the remedy of fortifying the executive power hoping that by bolstering the
constitutional government, the observance of constitutional guarantees might be achieved.
He lauded the example of the 1833 Chilean Constitution's state of siege provision because it
allowed the president to become "king" when anarchy threatened the constitutional order.
This was an admitted divergence from the U.S. model, but an essential one. Without it,
Alberdi considered that the South American political climate would not permit the exercise
of the individual rights ostensibly won with independence. JUAN B. ALBERDi, supra note 2, at
171-80.
43. Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op.; Judgment of May 15, 1981, 1981-C L.L. 108-
09 [hereinafter Moya case] and cases cited therein; Judgment of Aug. 9, 1977, C.J.N., 298
Fallos 441 [hereinafter Zamorano case].
1986]
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swift, declaratory action in emergencies."' Moreover, the investiga-
tive capacity of the political branches would seem to render them
institutionally fit for the requisite fact-finding. Furthermore, from
the perspective of political accountability, it is arguable that de-
claratory action should be left in the hands of those who will be
held responsible for their actions at the polls. It is worth noting
that legislators, during recent congressional debate concerning a
bill' 5 regulating the interposition of writs of habeas corpus during
a state of siege, expressly disavowed any intention to sanction judi-
cial review of the declaratory act and the fact-finding behind it.46
Similarly, questions relating to the permissible duration of a
state of siege have traditionally fallen outside the realm of judicial
cognizance.47 The Court has annulled executive decrees issued pur-
suant to state of siege powers on grounds that the state of siege has
endured too long.48 The Court has not moved, however, to invali-
date the state of siege itself on grounds of its staleness.' 9 The text
of the Constitution is ambiguous on the temporal aspects of an
emergency state.5 0
Although commendable in theory, this display of judicial re-
straint bred unsavory results. Almost every de facto government
declared a state of siege and dispensed with basic guarantees to life
and liberty. 1 Furthermore, in those instances where Congress was
44. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1959, C.J.N., 243 Fallos 504, 515 [hereinafter Antonio Sofia
case]; Julieta Meyans de Pueyrred6n case, 170 Fallos at 246.
45. The bill became Law 23.098, Sept. 28, 1984, 44-D A.D.L.A. 3733. See 44-D A.D.L.A.
3733 (1984).
46. Diario de Sesiones de Is Ctmara de Senadores de Ia Naci6n, 23a reuni6n. 15a sesi6n
ordinaria, 19 de septiembre de 1984, at 2033, cited in Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op.,
at considerando 5.
47. Bidart Campos, Duraci6n del Estado de Sitio y de los Arrestos Politicos, 93 E.D.
489 (1981).
48. See the Mallo case, 282 Fallos 392 (annulling a specific measure adopted under
state of siege powers).
49. The Court may soon assert durational review if it has not already done so. In the
latest discussion of Article 23, the Court seems to have abandoned its exhortation regarding
the transitory nature of states of siege in favor of substantive doctrine. The Court states
that a term of duration, expressed in the declaration, "is a condition of validity" of the
suspension of constitutional rights. Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op. at considerando 6.
In Granada, the state of siege in question announced its own expiration date.
50. The Argentine Constitution accords the President the power to declare a state of
siege with the Senate's confirmation in the event of foreign attack; the declaration is to be
made for a limited time. CONST. art. 86, cl. 19 (Argen.). The other state of siege provisions
omit this key phrase. Bidart Campos, however, argues that, a fortiori, the temporal restraint
should enjoy universal application. See MANUAL DE DERECHO, supra note 9, at 173-74.
51. Not only the state of siege provided for in Article 23 has been abused. In addition,
look-alike, extraconstitutional declarations of states of emergency have been declared.
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dissolved, the legislative check over executive declarations was dis-
solved along with it. In short, there has often been little to prevent
behavior that responds to the fancy of the executive rather than
the constitutional needs of the nation.
52
In contrast to its passive approach to reviewing the declara-
tory act, the Court has begun to fashion an active check on mea-
sures adopted under a state of siege. The result has been a much
needed increase in the protection of individual liberties. This was
not always the case, however. Until recently, the Court had held
the adoption of specific emergency measures pursuant to a state of
siege declaration to be nonjusticiable.58 Traditional doctrine con-
strued the crucial clause of Article 23 ("suspension of constitu-
tional guarantees") to mean suspension of all guarantees, regard-
less of their relation to the exigencies that provoked the state of
siege declaration." 4 The Court also traditionally characterized acts,
such as the closing of a publication or arrest of a person pursuant
to state of siege powers, as transitory security measures and not as
penalties. 55
Per6n, for instance, suspended constitutional guarantees when he announced a "state of
internal warfare."
52. In retrospect, fervent adhesion to the political question doctrine was a mistake. Ar-
gentine history exposes a string of powerful executives, which, contrary to Alberdi's proph-
ecy, did not foster respect for individual rights. Greater control by the Court, not height-
ened deference, was called for. Nevertheless, vigorous judicial oversight might have
backfired; too much control over Article 23 might have prompted de facto regimes to disown
the Constitution in its entirety.
53. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 30, 1958, C.J.N., 242 Fallos 540 [hereinafter Monaco
case]; Judgment of Aug. 22, 1956, C.J.N., 235 Fallos 681 [hereinafter Norberto H. Cuello
case]; Judgment of Apr. 5, 1892, C.J.N., 48 Fallos 17 [hereinafter Fermin Rodriguez case].
54. See Judgment of Mar. 3, 1970, C.J.N., Argen. 138 L.L. 464 [hereinafter Primera
Plana case] (Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution "imports the suspension of individual
guarantees, among them the liberty of the press."); see also Judgment of May 9, 1962,
C.J.N., 252 Fallos 244, 247 [hereinafter Suaze Almagro case]; J.R. VANossI, supra note 40, at
487.
55. See, e.g., Suaze Almagro case, 252 Fallos at 248 (closing of a newspaper and seques-
tration of its issues are not penalties, but rather "transitory security or defense measures");
Julieta Meyans de Peurredon case, 170 Fallos at 246 (arrest of a person pursuant to a state
of siege does not constitute a penalty, as the term is employed in Article 23). Thus, the
executive measures escape various pitfalls: they steer clear of Article 23's prohibition of pen-
alties; they avoid entanglement in Article 18's injunction that, "no inhabitant of the Nation
may be penalized without a prior trial based on laws enacted prior to the cause"; and finally,
they are subjected to the Court's reasonableness review and not the more rigorous scrutiny
applied in the Moya case, 1981-C L.L. 108. The landmark Timerman case, 301 Fallos 771,
however, departed from this position in the field of arrests of people. Whether this change
spills over to the press remains to be seen. For arguments that it should, see JR. VANossl,
supra note 40, at 499; G. BIDART CAMPos, LA CORTE SUPREMA 169 (1982).
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In the landmark case Antonio Sofia, 6 however, the Court un-
veiled judicial review over measures adopted to quell an internal
commotion. In Antonio Sofia, the executive had invoked state of
siege powers to ban the proposed meeting of a "leftist" political
group. The organization, known as The Argentine League for
Human Rights, had applied for permission to hold a meeting in a
Buenos Aires theater. The discussion was to center on the obser-
vance of human rights in Paraguay. Permission to convene was de-
nied on the basis of the extant state of siege, which had been de-
clared in response to a series of labor strikes and insurrections in
key Argentine industrial sectors.57 The League contested the exec-
utive's ban arguing that the proposed meeting had no connection
whatsoever with the labor strife that prompted the imposition of
the emergency state.
In passing upon the League's contentions, the Court made its
usual observation that the declaration itself was non-reviewable. It
continued, however, with the novel assertion that measures
adopted thereunder must be "reasonable." 8 While this posture
marked a departure from the past, the actual control asserted was
weak. Review of ameliorative measures was deemed to be "outside
the sphere of judicial competence except in strictly exceptional
cases." 5' 9 An exceptional case would arise "when measures adopted
are clearly and manifestly unreasonable, in other words, when...
they bear no relation whatsoever to the ends of Article 23."10 In
the interest of clarity, the Court postulated an example of what
might constitute such manifest irrationality: denying a foreigner
the right to marry on the basis of Article 23 would be so unreason-
able as to be susceptible of judicial review.61
Finally, the Court gave the criterion by which it would mea-
sure reasonableness. In so doing, it seemingly emasculated the test
altogether. Judges were advised to refer to "the immediate cause of
the state of siege-internal commotion-and not to the concrete
56. Antonio Sofia case, 243 Fallos at 504.
57. Estado de Sitio, 18-B A.D.L.A. 1223 (1959).
58. Antonio Sofia case, 243 Falos at 515. This reasonableness review extended to all
individual liberties except physical liberty which was deemed to have been textually com-
mitted to the president via the terms of Article 23. It was not until 1977 that the Court
extended this control over physical liberty as well. See G. BIDART CAMPOS, LA CORTE
SUPREMA 157-67 (description of this evolution).
59. Antonio Sofia case, 243 Fallos at 515.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 516.
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motives that the legislature may have mentioned as its causal fac-
tors. ' 'e2 As if the newfound power of review could withstand fur-
ther whittling, the Court added that restrictions on activities that
"may" contribute to, maintain, or aggravate the internal commo-
tion should be considered reasonable.6 3 A generic, and hence inef-
fectual, reasonableness test was born. Needless to say, the prohibi-
tion of the meeting in the Antonio Sofia case fell easily within the
elastic contours of "reasonableness."'
'a
The reasonableness test, however, soon outgrew its humble be-
ginnings. The Court's present test spells out specific criteria by
which to measure the reasonableness of state of siege restrictions.
Indeed, these measurements are being made with ever-increasing
precision with the result that all Executive decrees are no longer
deemed reasonable.6"
The current reasonableness test is two-tiered. It considers the
relation between the guarantee affected by the restrictive measure
and the state of internal commotion that prompted the declara-
tion, and whether the restrictive measures are of proportions justi-
fied by the ends sought through the declaration. a Significantly, the
Court has narrowed its hitherto generic view of "internal commo-
tion" and the myriad of factors that "may" exacerbate it. It has
begun to focus on the motives set forth in the declaration of the
state of siege as the relevant facts against which to measure the
reasonableness of a given restriction. In Mallo, for example, an ex-
ecutive decree banned and sequestered a documentary film about
recent Argentine history on the grounds that its showing would
disturb the public peace. The film addressed, among other events,
the dethroning of Per6n in the coup of 1955."1 The Executive
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Bidart Campos, Reflexiones sobre la Libertad de Frensa durante el Estado de
Sitio, 31 E.D. 456 (1970)(critique of the sieve-like qualities inherent in Antonio Sofia refer-
ence points).
65. The power of review has also been asserted in areas that do not involve application
of the reasonableness test. In these areas, review is rooted more firmly in the text of Article
23 of the Argentine Constitution. See, e.g., Moya case, 1981-C L.L. at 108 (the Executive
may not deny a detainee the option to leave the country); Timerman case, 301 Fallos at 771
(the Executive may not apply penalties under Article 23; indefinite detention without expla-
nation of cause exceeds bounds of transitory security and acquires penal character); see
generally Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op., at considerando 5.
66. Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op., at considerando 6, citing 300 Fallos 816, 820
(1978).
67. Mallo case, 282 Fallos at 392.
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based its prohibition on the state of siege it had declared three
years earlier to subdue terrorist and labor violence in the northern
province of C6rdoba. In overturning the Executive's prohibition,
the Court did not refer to the existence of "internal commotion" in
the generic sense. Instead, it measured the ban's reasonableness
against the particular provocation that motivated the declaration,
i.e., the labor strife in C6rdoba.65
The second significant shift in the state of siege doctrine re-
lates to the suspension of guarantees. As previously discussed, the
Court no longer adheres to the interpretation that would sweep all
rights into suspension regardless of their relationship to the events
that prompted the state of siege declaration. This was made clear
in the Mallo case where the Court stated that only "some"
rights-"those [rights] that are incompatible with the end of con-
trolling the internal commotion or exterior attack"-should fall
prey to suspension.6'
It is noteworthy that the Court's state of siege doctrine ap-
pears to be winning an audience in the political branches. This was
evident in the case of the Executive's most recent declaration,
which was interposed with the aim of stopping a wave of bombings
that preceded the November 3, 1985 congressional elections. The
Executive decree contained a number of self-limitations along the
lines suggested by the Court.70 It professed a sixty-day duration,
expressly stated that all guarantees were not suspended (it singled
out press liberties for special preservation), and set forth its ante-
cedent causes.
7 1
Recently, Congress has also taken note of the Court's reasona-
bleness standard. On October 19, 1984, Congress embodied its rec-
ognition of Court doctrine in Law 23.098. The legislation regulates
the interposition of writs of habeas corpus during a state of siege
and Article 4 of the statute directs every court that reviews a writ
to investigate,
(1) [t]he legitimacy of the declaration of the state of siege, (2)
the correlation between the order of privation of liberty and the
68. Id. at 399.
69. Id. at 397; G. BmIAT CAMPOS, LA CORTE SUPREMA 164.
70. Estado de Sitio, Decreto 2069, 45-D A.D.L.A. 3722 (1985).
71. It may be noted, however, that President Alfonsin arguably ignored the first princi-
ple of the Court's teachings: Article 23 is to be invoked in periods of extreme danger, not as




situation that gave rise to the state of siege . . . [and] (4) the
effective exercise of the right to opt to leave the country pro-
vided for in the final section of Article 23 of the National
Constitution.2
The latter directives embody the Court's reasonableness test
and its textually-based review over the option to leave the country
asserted in the Moya case.7 3 On the other hand, the first directive,
Article 4(1), seems to mark a departure from the Court's political
question policy. This first clause appears to sanction judicial re-
view over the declaration and perhaps the duration of a state of
seige. This interpretation stems not only from the straight-forward
text of Article 4(1), but also from the historical context of the en-
actment. Law 23.098 was adopted less than one year after the re-
birth of democracy in Argentina. At that time, the extended state
of siege of the Proceso, the rash of disappearances that accompa-
nied it, and the impotence of habeas corpus as a means of locating
and liberating those seized, were still fresh in the minds of the
Congress.
71
The Supreme Court, however, decided otherwise. The Court,
relying in part on remarks made by the bill's author in congres-
sional debates, concluded that Law 23.098 did not intend to vary
traditional state of siege doctrine.7s The result is that declarations
are still unreviewable. Interpretive issues aside, Law 23.098 re-
mains significant. Its contents demonstrate that the legislature,
like the executive, is engaged in constitutional dialogue with the
Court over the proper scope of Article 23. To be sure, political his-
tory provided the impetus for the dialogue. Judicial doctrine, how-
ever, provided its conceptual lexicon.
V. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE STATE OF SIEGE
The evolution of the reasonableness test is linked to the ascen-
dence of press freedoms. Two cases involving such freedoms and
one implicating freedom of expression through the film medium
72. Law 23.098, 44-D A.D.L.A. 3733 (1984). See Cirdenas, Legal Memoranda: Argen-
tina, 16 U. MIAMI INrER-AM. L. REv. 695 (1985)(succinct summary of the law's contents).
73. See Maya case, 1981-C L.L. 108; Amadeo, El Valor de la Doctrina de la Corte
Suprema, Nov. 1, 1985, L.L. (treatment of the importance of the Court's doctrine in the
genesis of Law 23.098).
74. See Garro, supra note 2, at 330-36 (discussion of the utter futility of thousands of
habeas corpus proceedings); NUNCA MAs, supra note 6, at 400-07.
75. Granada case, No. G-414-XX, slip op., at considerando 5.
19861
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
lay bare this relationship. They also, however, expose some cracks
in the Court's exercise of judicial review.
As recently as 1970, the Court applied an extremely weak rea-
sonableness test to the closure of a publication.7 The Primera
Plana case involved the closure of a weekly publication and the
sequestration of one of its issues pursuant to an executive decree
promulgated under state of siege powers. 77 Primera Plana em-
ployed a watered-down reasonableness standard under which a de-
cree need only survive scrutiny for "manifest unreasonableness. ' 78
The required minimum rationality was easily discovered in both
tiers of the reasonableness test in this case. First, the guarantee
affected-freedom of the press from prior censorship-was held to
bear a reasonable relation to the generic motive (internal commo-
tion) for the state of siege declaration. Second, the measures were
properly proportioned, or tailored, to the aims of the declaration.
In the Court's view, the declaration sought to calm contemporane-
ous disturbances and, additionally, to prevent dislocations that
might surface in the future.79 The excessive elasticity of this analy-
sis is obvious.
Shortly after Primera Plana was decided, the Mallo case
arose. In Mallo, the Court applied a standard of review with con-
siderably more bite although the factual setting did not differ
markedly from that presented in Primera Plana. In Mallo, an ex-
ecutive decree issued under a state of siege prohibited the showing
of a documentary film.8 0 Authority for the ban was rooted in the
same state of siege that served as the basis for the closure in
76. Primera Plana, 138 L.L. 464.
77. Primera Plana was a popular news magazine with a reportage and layout akin to
those of Time Magazine. On the evening of August 5, 1969, federal police appeared at its
offices and informed the managing editor that edition 345 was to be sequestered by execu-
tive decree. The measure also closed the magazine and prohibited it from publishing under
another name. No copy of the decree was presented. At midnight, however, the Ministry of
the Interior announced that,
the Executive has given repeated evidence of its respect for free expression,
which it has protected in the exercise of its public function. Circumstances that
are of public knowledge obliged the implantation of a state of siege to guarantee
liberty and public safety. As a consequence of this obligation and considering
that Primera Plana is engaged in a campaign based on inexact information des-
tined to create a climate of confusion, the Executive ordered its closure.
Decree 4179, officially closing the magazine, was promulgated the following day. See La Na-
ci6n, Aug. 6-7, 1969 (editorial coverage).
78. Primera Plana, 138 L.L. at 461.
79. Id.
80. MaWo case, 282 Fallos 392; see supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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Primera Plana. Similar constitutional guarantees were implicated
because the Court held that the film medium falls within the ambit
of constitutionally protected freedom of expression."
In Mallo, the Court seemed to unveil a new mode of inquiry.
The Mallo analysis focused on whether a current showing of the
film in question might intensify the specific internal commotion
that triggered the siege declaration. The Court, answering this
question in the negative, scrutinized the film's character and con-
tents in camera, the particular factors that prompted the 1969
state of siege declaration and the country's contrasting political
state when Mallo was decided. The shift from the Primera Plana
approach is evident. Instead of offering only vague analysis, the
Mallo decision concentrated on specific facts.
In annulling the de facto decree at issue in Mallo, the Court
emphasized the birth of new "circumstances that condition the
present reality of the country. ''82 Chief among these "circum-
stances" ranked the recent announcement of elections, the resusci-
tation of political parties, the authorization of public gatherings
and the consequent freedom to examine public issues. These inter-
vening events created a new socio-political environment. Viewed in
the context of this distinct environment, the Executive decree was
deemed an exorbitant and unreasonable use of state of siege pow-
ers. In so holding, the Court attacked the heart of the executive
decision-making process and evaluated for itself the country's past
and present need for emergency measures.
The Court gave great weight to its in camera screening of the
film at issue. It pronounced the film "objectively" devoid of insur-
rectional content. The Court admitted that the film treated cur-
rent historical events that had caused profound divisions among
Argentines and that it therefore might well stimulate "polemics."
Still, these "circumstantial reactions" were "certainly not to be
confused with the deep and widespread disturbance that Law
18.262 refers to" (declaring the 1969 state of siege)."3
The Malto analysis, "reasonableness review with bite," relies
on changed circumstances and particularized in camera review of
banned materials. It was later employed in another landmark free-
81. Maflo case, 282 Fallos at 397.
82. Id. at 399.
83. Id. at 398, 400.
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dom of the press case.' The Editorial Perfil case arose out of the
closing of a weekly magazine, entitled La Semana, during a state
of siege. The events that prompted the closing reveal the incum-
bent r6gime's extremely attenuated tolerance levels.
La Semana, a popular mainstream magazine, features inter-
views with artistic and political personalities. The cover of its Oc-
tober 28, 1982 issue displayed a photograph of Gerardo Sofovich, a
leading Argentine television director. Sofovich was depicted wear-
ing a large grin and a military officer's hat with his hands out-
spread at either side of his head with palms forward, gesturing in
mocking fashion. The accompanying caption read, "the Russian
against the colonels." The cover story consisted of innocuous inter-
views with Sofovich and the colonel who had been appointed to
direct the television channel during the Proceso. It was clearly the
cover, not the story, that provoked the closing."5
The Junta responded with a decree promulgated on October
29, 198286 introduced by a verbose statement on the need to
strengthen constitutional institutions and foster the transition to
democracy. The decree indicated that an inability to countenance
"systematic and reiterated degradations to essential institutions of
the Republic" and to those "invested with the public function"
had prompted the closing. La Semana's cover had "exceeded the
mark of healthy criticism. '87 The decree's operative sections closed
La Semana, prohibited the printing and circulation of its magazine
and production of future issues, and sequestered all copies of the
offensive issue. Phones, typewriters, and other printing equipment
were seized.
La Semana contested the decree's validity arguing that the ex-
ecutive had exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in exercising
state of siege powers. The Federal Appeals Court, like the Mallo
Court, scrutinized the banned material and denied that it partook
of the qualities the Executive had ascribed to it.68 The court un-
derscored the existence of "changed circumstances." In examining
whether a reasonable link bridged the events that triggered the
84. Judgment of Nov. 10, 1982, C.J.N., 103 E.D. 284 (1982)[hereinafter Editorial Perfil
case].
85. See La Semana, Oct. 28, 1982, edition 313. See La Naci6n, Oct. 30-31, 1982 (con-
temporary commentary on the closing); La Semana, Dec. 16, 1983, edition 314 (summary).
86. Editorial Peril case, 103 E.D. at 294.
87. Decreto 1075, XLL-D A.D.L.A. 3753 (1982).
88. Editorial Perfil case, 103 E.D. at 295.
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state of siege declaration and the closing of La Semana, the court
noted that eight years separated the declaration and the decree.
Without further elaboration, the court found that, "the present
circumstances are incompatible, in light of the well-known ten-
dency toward institutional normalization, with extensive applica-
tion of those powers that conspire against a means that is integral
to achieving that normalcy such as the freedom of expression."89
The changed circumstances standard seems well established.
It remains to be seen whether this standard can withstand critical
analysis. This type of review is in one sense salutary: it helps up-
hold press freedoms. Moreover, the focus on temporal aspects in
overseeing state of siege measures rests on a firm foundation. The
Argentine founders envisioned limited, transitory states of siege
that respond to truly extraordinary events. The Court aligned it-
self with this view nearly a century ago.90 Finally, close scrutiny of
the allegedly offending materials in the Mallo and Editorial Perfil
cases seems justified; a serious application of the second prong of
the reasonableness test, which probes proportionality, demands it.
The Mallo and Editorial Perfil decisions are nevertheless dis-
turbing. The Court has created a task for the judiciary for which it
is institutionally unfit. It also appears to have contradicted itself.
The Mallo and Editorial Perfil courts reviewed the prohibited ma-
terial to ascertain whether it would exacerbate or prolong the origi-
nal state of commotion. This analysis requires fact-finding in two
areas. The first inquiry assesses the nature of the banned material
and its potential impact upon its audience. The second inquiry,
examines the link-or lack thereof-between the contemporary
state of commotion and the condition that had triggered the state
of siege declaration. These factors form the core of the Mallo and
Editorial Perfil reasonableness standard. Yet, these happen to be
factors that a court is ill-equipped to evaluate. The framers of the
Constitution recognized this in allocating state of siege powers to
the political branches. The Court has also acknowledged its own
inadequacy in this area by refusing to review declarations. It is not
the Court's function to undertake periodic diagnoses of the na-
tion's political, social, and economic health. This task falls within
the purview of the executive and legislative branches.
89. Id. The normalization process alluded to resulted in the reinstatement of demo-
cratic government in late 1983.
90. Leandro Alem case, 54 Fallos at 432.
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The contradiction in avoiding review of the factual bases for
state of seige declarations, while scrutinizing the same factual
predicates under the rubric of "changed circumstances" review,
arose from quirks in the constitutional structure. Theoretical ten-
sion inheres in a legal order that weds the separation of powers to
a checking matrix. Independence clashes with the checking powers
invested in other branches. Events in Argentine history have exac-
erbated this tension. The habitual abuse of Article 23 and the fre-
quent dissolution of Congress have pressured the Court into fash-
ioning a checking power over state of siege measures. At the same
time, however, the Court has continued to recognize the value of
separated powers and independent decision-making with respect to
the declaration and duration of a state of seige.
The Court should adopt a more consistent line of thought and
admit its assumption of fact-finding duties when it exercises its
control over measures adopted. Recent history suggests that con-
sistency be achieved by instituting review over the declaration and
duration of a state of siege. The Court is already engaged in the
requisite analysis under a different guise. Moreover, an attempt to
cure the inconsistency by abandoning all judicial review would
subject important rights to unbridled abuse. A weak form of the
minimum rationality test propounded in Primera Plana might be
adopted at the outset. In this respect, it is important to recall that
the Constitution offers guidance on the conditions that properly
give rise to a state of siege declaration. Article 23 refers to "com-
motion that endangers the operation of the Constitution and its
institutions." Small scale disturbances do not meet this standard.
Accordingly, they should not be permitted to trigger a state of
siege declaration."e The Court could develop standards on a case
by case basis that provide the executive branch flexibility without
relinquishing the power of review. The Court has already laid the
theoretical foundation for review over declarations. In cases involv-
ing control over specific measures, the Court has stated that its
91. Vanossi, for example, postulates that principled review is feasible when a declara-
tion is made under conditions that "clearly" lack the degree of severity contemplated in
Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution. Argentine politics may make the judicial task eas-
ier than might first appear. Vanossi opines that a state of siege has frequently been invoked
when conditions "manifestly" failed to measure up to the constitutional standard. JR. VA-
NOSSi, supra note 40, at 487. Bidart Campos constructs a different argument for review,
stating that Article 100 of the Argentine Constitution gives the Court "jurisdiction to decide
all cases . . . governed by the Constitution"; the declaration of a state of siege is governed
by the Constitution; hence, it is logically subject to review. MANUAL DE DERECHO, supra note
9, at 451; MANUAL DE DamncHo CoNsTrrucIoNAL ARGEN 'rNo 455-60 (1981).
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powers of review "must be extended [to] the point where they con-
verge with the values of Argentine society" that have been en-
trusted to the Court.92 These values are synonymous with those
embodied in the Constitution. It is time to recognize that safe-
guarding these values requires control over arbitrary decisions des-
tined to damage them.
VI. PROTECTION OF THE PRESS IN THE DE FACTO SETTING
Two 1968 cases illustrate the interaction between the de facto
doctrine and Article 14 within the context of press closings. 9 The
cases arose as follows. In 1966, the military unseated civilian Presi-
dent Illia, proclaimed the Statute of the Argentine Revolution and
dissolved the provincial and national congresses . 4 A state of siege,
however, was not declared. In late 1967, the de facto Executive
banned the publication and circulation of two periodicals that had
been engaged in rather virulent criticism of the military govern-
ment. In the Executive's opinion, this behavior obstructed the
achievement of the government's goals.' 5 The Executive argued
that constitutional rights could not operate in opposition to the
political aims of the revolution, and that the criticism in these pe-
riodicals ran counter to this caveat.
The Azul y Blanco and Prensa Confidencial cases questioned
the scope of de facto power and the breadth of press freedoms.
The Court reasoned that the absence of a state of siege declaration
left all constitutional guarantees in full effect despite the "revolu-
tion" and used two arguments to rebut the Executive's conten-
tions. First, the Court reconciled the aims in the revolutionary
statute with the continued enjoyment of constitutional freedoms,"
relying upon the statute's expressed intent to restore the "concept
of authority, the sense of respect for the law and the reign of true
92. See Zamorano case, 298 Fallos at 444.
93. Judgment of Apr. 30, 1968, C.J.N., 22 E.D. 576 [hereinafter Prensa Confidencial
case]; Judgment of Apr. 30, 1968, C.J.N., 22 E.D. 580 [hereinafter Azul y Blanco case].
94. The statute also provided for the replacement of the Supreme Court's members, for
the dissolution of all political parties, for provisional sequestration of their assets, and for
federal intervention in each of the provinces and the national territories. Acto de la Revolu-
ci6n Argentina, 26-B A.D.L.A. 753 (1966).
95. Prensa Confidencial was a weekly, highly politicized publication of about a dozen
pages. Its habit of criticizing the incumbent military regime provoked several closings in the
late 1960's. Azul y Blanco, another small weekly with similar characteristics, suffered a simi-
lar fate for the same reasons.
96. Azul y Blanco case, 22 E.D. at 581-82; Prensa Confidencial case, 22 E.D. at 580.
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justice, in a republican regime in which the exercise of duties,
rights, and individual freedoms will have full operation." '9 Second,
the Court implied that were this common purpose absent, the goal
of achieving national security to advance the objectives of the
revolution could not, of itself, negate "essential human rights."9 8
The Court reasoned that if a true threat to the nation's security
arose, the political branches could invoke Article 23. The decisions
recognize the competence of de facto governments to reach the
objectives set forth in their revolutionary programs so long as they
do not trample on constitutionally protected rights in so doing."'
In short, if guarantees are to be suspended, they must be constitu-
tionally suspended.
The Court, however, went further in clarifying the relationship
between de facto power and press liberties. In these cases, the
Court considered perhaps the foremost function of a free press in a
democratic society-its service as an informative bridge between
the government and its citizens. A free press supplies the electo-
rate with the information it needs to intelligently exercise its sov-
ereign power. An unfettered press insures that government officials
remain responsive to the population at large. 00 In Azul y Blanco,
the Court found that "the exercise of free criticism of public offi-
cials for official acts must be recognized as an essential manifesta-
tion of freedom of the press as it is one of the very pillars of repub-
lican government." 10 1 The Court also noted that the Executive's
prior dissolution of political parties had not suspended press pro-
tections because the dissolution "does not deny that man, as the
political being that he is, partakes of the natural right to think and
97. Id. This is not the only time the Court has interpreted a revolutionary statute in a
way that opposes the construction proffered by the de facto Executive that drafted it. See,
e.g., Timerman case, 301 Fallos 771. While we may laud the outcome of this tactic, it seems
suspect as a judicial device. It is likely that the Executive is best informed as to its aims and
how to achieve them.
98. Azul y Blanco case, 22 E.D. at 582; Prensa Confidencial case, 22 E.D. at 580.
99. See Bidart Campos, La Libertad de Prensa "Aqui y Ahora," 22 E.D. 576 (1968).
100. See J. Brandeis' classic concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); F.
SHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 36 (1982).
101. Azul y Blanco case, 22 E.D. at 582 citing Judgment of Oct. 30, 1967, C.J.N., 20
E.D. 192 [hereinafter Moreno y Timerman case]. These cases involved the crime of desa-
cato. Its elements consist of "threatening, injuring, or in any way offending the dignity of a
public functionary because of the exercise of his functions." C6digo Penal art. 244
(Argen.)(emphasis added). The collision between desacato and the enlightened prose quoted
from Azul y Blanco is apparent. The Court's narrow construction of Article 244, however,
reduces the incidence of desacato convictions.
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to express his thought on public matters.P1 0 2
These pronouncements, together with the Court's declaration
that "although Article 14 announces only individual rights, it is
clear that the Constitution, in establishing law over the freedom of
the press, is fundamentally protecting its democratic essence,"103
reaffirm the Court's appreciation of the bonds between a free press
and democracy. In Azul y Blanco and Prensa Confidencial, the
Court transformed its appreciation into action by annulling the
Executive's closure decrees.
VII. CONCLUSION
During the last half century, the Argentine Constitution has
endured severe strain. De facto r6gimes usurped power, dissolved
Congress, and trampled constitutional guarantees. While the intru-
sion of this "fourth branch" was traumatic, important aspects of
constitutionalism endured. In this connection, two questions re-
main unanswered. First, why the constant trauma? Second, why
did the Constitution and its values survive?
Juan B. Alberdi's remarks shed light on the sources of Argen-
tina's constitutional turmoil. Writing well over a century ago, the
father of the Argentine Constitution observed:
[T]here is always a stated hour in which the human word is
given flesh. When this hour has sounded, he who utters the
word, orator or author, makes law. In this case the law is not his,
it is the product of the times. But this is the law that lasts, be-
cause it is the true law.1
0
4
Alberdi was writing to catalyze the adoption of the 1853 Constitu-
tion. He believed the hour was ripe for his constitutional proposals
to become law, and in large measure, they did. History has shown,
however, that Argentina was not as prepared to follow its new con-
stitution as a handful of Argentine intellectuals and statesmen
were to adopt it.'
o
0
102. Azul y Blanco case, 22 E.D. at 582.
103. Judgment of Nov. 11, 1960, C.J.N., 248 Fallos 291 [hereinafter Edelmiro Abal
case].
104. J. ALBERDI, supra note 2, at 31.
105. Interestingly enough, Alberdi was aware of this. Id. at 52-56. His intention was to
convert Argentina into a receptacle for the "civilizing" and democratizing effects of Euro-
pean immigration. The Constitution was in large measure written toward that end. On the
critical importance of intersection between the set of constitutional precepts and a society's
universe of social norms, see R.A. DAHL, A PREFACE ro DEMOCRATiC THEORY (1956).
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The country's intermittent bouts with de facto governments
and the corresponding, erratic observance of basic guarantees are
partly explained by the importation of ideals unleashed in the
American and French Revolutions into a society lacking a recep-
tive political climate."'6 In stark contrast to the colonial experience
in North America, pre-constitutional Argentina had no experience
with a limited constitutional government. A spate of authoritarian
caudillos ruled the divided nation until 1852. Autocratic rule per-
sisted until 1912 despite the existence of the 1853 Constitution.
Grafting liberal ideals onto an authoritarian tradition might be ex-
pected to produce a hybrid, and it has.
Speculation about the perseverance of constitutionalism impli-
cates a number of factors. Among them are Argentina's identifica-
tion with western traditions and values and the military's frequent,
ironic, expressions of its desire to guide the nation back onto a
constitutional course. Surely, another crucial factor is the behavior
of the Supreme Court. From the inception of the de facto phenom-
enon, the Court reacted to de facto reality by relinquishing the in-
evitable while clinging to the concepts of judicial review and con-
stitutionalism. The Court ensured that the judicial voice would be
heard, even if at muted levels. In so doing, the Court helped to
guarantee that Argentina's tradition of strong-armed executives
would not suffocate its less developed juridical heritage of limited
government.
The Court has also struggled to establish principled standards
of review over the use of Article 23. Because the use of state of
siege power implies the suspension of individual guarantees and a
concomitant shift of power to the Executive, judicial oversight has
bolstered both the constitutional framework and the rights it up-
holds. Unfortunately, the vacuum created by the absence of con-
gressional checking power has placed undue strain on the Court.
Judicial review may, of necessity, entail overstepping the tradi-
tional boundaries of judicial power.
106. Following the classic Latin American configuration, political and economic power
were too highly concentrated for too long. Authoritarianism thrived below a democratic ve-
neer. See generally L.E. HARRISON, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IS A STATE OF MIND; THE CASE OF
LATIN AMERICA (1980); R.A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA: 1945-1962
(1980); R.A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA: 1928-1945 (1969); JR. SCOBIE,
ARGENTINA, A CITY AND A NATION (1971); A.P. WHITAKER, ARGENTINA (1964). The books by
Scobie and Whitaker are general historical works. Harrison's recent publication treats Ar-
gentine culture as it relates to development. Potash's work is a fascinating look at the
seminal role of the Argentine armed forces in politics.
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In an area that is closely linked to the evolution of the de
facto and state of siege doctrines, such as the freedom of the press,
the Court has expanded the ambit of relevant constitutional provi-
sions and expounded classic principles of free expression. This ex-
pansion of rights has entailed annulling those de facto decrees that
do not share these principles.
Unfortunately, the repressive distortions of de facto Execu-
tives often have overshadowed the Court's flashes of constitution-
alism. This sobering perspective, however, does not mean that the
Court has labored in vain. Important press freedoms have been sal-
vaged in specific cases. Dialogue between the Court and the politi-
cal branches over the scope of Article 23 has begun. The Court
may take pride in the knowledge that it remained an important
constitutional symbol during periods when such signs were sadly
lacking.
